Neil Duzett

Using a regression discontinuity design that exploits close elections between different-race candidates, I estimate the causal effect of increasing racial diversity on city council performance, measured by future vote shares. Consistent with theories on diversity in groups of varying sizes, I find that diversity improves performance in large councils, increasing next election vote shares by 5.9%. However, increased diversity has no effect or decreases performance in small councils. I investigate key communication mechanisms through natural language processing on city council meeting transcripts. I find that increased racial diversity causes large shifts in discussion topics, moving discussion toward commentary from the public and city officials and zoning legislation. However, diversity also increases negative sentiment overall within these meetings by 35% from baseline. Heterogeneity by council size suggests differences in these crucial communication mechanisms may drive the differences in performance gains. These results highlight the role of communication in mediating diversity’s effects, showing that diversity enhances performance when groups are large enough to mitigate frictions.

We examine the transmission of lifespan across generations in the US using a unique dataset containing more than 26 million individuals born between 1880 and 1920. On average, 47 percent of men and 57 percent of women lived longer than their parents, though this varied across cohorts and socio-economic groups. The intergenerational persistence in lifespan is low across cohorts and socio-economic groups, and it is much smaller than persistence in socio-economic status. Moreover, persistence in lifespan and in socio-economic status are independent of each other. Lifetime well-being, which combines socioeconomic and lifespan measures, is less persistent than socio-economic measures suggest.

Using national data on local government elections in the U.S., I show that in close elections between candidates of different genders, defeat consistently goes to the candidate who does not match current officeholders’ most common gender. These gender-minority candidates are 1.9 times as likely to lose as win near the victory cutoff. This penalty exists for both women and men, is present across multiple government offices, and results in long run elected body compositions being 7% less female. I provide evidence that gender disparities in campaign donations contribute to this gender-minority penalty in close elections.